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Overview 
We will firstly outline the rationale of a public good game and explain the distinction 
between a continuous public good game and a threshold public good game. As a vast majority of 
experimental research in social psychology on public good games has used threshold public good 
games, we will then outline the structure of a dilemma game with a provision point. Our point is 
that dilemma games with a provision point violate two important assumptions commonly held for 
public good games: a) there is always a conflict between the group’s interest and the individual’s 
interest; and b) an individual is always better off defecting. A threshold dilemma game is a 
dilemma with a coordination game embedded in it. Hence it provides focal point solutions and 
may as a consequence leave less room for other factors to affect behavior. Moreover, games with 
a provision point might yield different results than games without a provision point. We will 
argue that above that threshold dilemma games do not provide good models of many the public 
goods problems that are encountered in real life. We will propose that a public good game with a 
tilted S function provides a more appropriate model of  real life dilemmas while fulfilling the 
defining properties of  public good games. 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, the Public Good Game and what they have to do with Social 
Psychology 
Anyone, who has attended an introductory social psychology class, will be familiar with 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and its rationale. Two people are in an interdependent decision 
making situation and communication between the two is not possible. They both have two 
options; they can either cooperate or defect. If they both defect their pay-off is lower compared to 
when they both cooperate. However, each of them will get the highest pay-off if they themselves 
defect, while the other cooperates. The cooperator is worst off in case her opponent defects. 
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Hence, if both cooperate, they both have an incentive to deviate from that situation, which will 
result in mutual defection as the only equilibrium. Equilibrium is a concept of game theory (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). It refers to a state in which no player has an incentive to deviate 
from his or her current position, given the chosen strategy of the other player(s). 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game can be extended to more than two persons with more than 
two decision options representing different levels of cooperation. These are referred to as public 
goods or resource dilemmas, or also in a very general sense as social dilemmas.  The underlying 
principle of the interdependency for public good, resource dilemmas, or social dilemmas is still 
the same as for the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: There is a conflict between the group’s interest 
and the interest of each individual. The group as a whole is best off when all decision-makers 
contribute their endowments in a public good game or leave the endowments in the resource in a 
resource dilemma. Each individual however is always better off keeping their endowments in a 
public good or taking everything they can from a common resource in a resource dilemma, no 
matter what the others do. Thus, the dilemma is between individual incentives to defect and 
avoiding the collectively bad outcome if everyone defecting. Subsequently we will focus our 
discussion on public good games, but we ask readers to keep in mind that the same reasoning 
holds for resource dilemma games.  
There are two ways of implementing a public goods game (see e.g. Komorita & Parks, 
1996). In the both ways, players are given an endowment of X units and decide how much of the 
endowment to contribute (Y: 0 ≤ Y ≤ X) to the public good, leaving the balance in their private 
account.  In a continuous function version of a public good game, each contribution to the public 
account is multiplied by a factor of c and the public pool is distributed equally among the players 
at the end of the game.  The size of c is set so that each player would be better off to keep a unit 
of her endowment than contributing it regardless of the decisions of the other players.  However, 
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if all players keep their endowments, they are worse off than if they had contributed all of their 
endowments.  This tension between contributing to the public good and keeping one’s 
endowment holds for decisions to increase one’s contribution from Y to Y+1, regardless of where 
Y falls in the interval of  0  to X-1, inclusive.   That is, a player’s payoff is always better when 
contributing Y than when contributing Y+1 and, thus, the only equilibrium for such a game is for 
all players to contribute nothing.  
Games with a provision point modify this basic game by defining a level of contribution 
at which a fixed amount is added to the public good1.  When total contributions fall short of the 
provision point, the contributions to the public account are lost.  When total contributions exceed 
the provision point, excess contributions are treated in two different ways: either nothing is 
gained by the excess contributions or the value of the common pool increases by a factor of c as 
in the continuous function game.  Thus, in the region of the provision point, it is no longer 
necessarily the case that a player is better off not contributing.  If her contribution of additional 
units results in satisfying the provision point, she is better off to contribute than not.  If the 
players’ joint contributions sum to the provision point, there is no incentive for any one of them 
to reduce her contribution.  Thus, the addition of a provision point changes the nature of the game 
in an important way.  The presence of a provision point results in multiple equilibriums: everyone 
contributing nothing is still an equilibrium but also any of the combinations of contributions 
among the players that equal the provision point are equilibriums. Games with a provision point 
are also referred to as step-level public good games. 
The amount of research that has been conducted on social dilemmas is enormous. Weber, 
Kopelman, and Messick (2004) reviewed the literature on social dilemmas of the last three 
decades. Many of the studies have used a game with a provision point, no matter whether they 
were looking at public good games or resource dilemmas. We have outlined the nature of a game 
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with a provision point above. The following example illustrates pay-off rules of a game with a 
provision point: A three-person public good game has a provision point of 9. Everything that the 
individuals keep to themselves is multiplied by 3, while, as soon as there are 9 or more 
endowments contributed to the common pool, these endowments are multiplied by 6 and divided 
to all three of them. If, however, there are less than 9 endowments in the common pool, no pay-
off at all would be resulting from the common pool and any endowments that are contributed to 
the pool are lost. Or, alternatively, players can obtain a fixed bonus when the provision point is 
reached or exceeded. Remarkably, in many reviews of the literature on public good games, the 
distinction between continuous and step-level public goods is either not made (e.g. Liebrand, 
Messick & Wilke, 1992), or when mentioned the review does not distinguish which studies used 
which type of game nor are the implications of type of game discussed (e.g., Komorita & Parks, 
1995, 1996). 
 
The structure of a dilemma-game with a provision point 
A public good game or a resource dilemma with a provision point is a dilemma with a 
coordination game embedded. The task of reaching the provision point is a coordination task. But 
there is a dilemma involved in how to accomplish that coordination task. However, managing the 
coordination task, hence successfully reaching the provision point does not display a conflict 
between the individual’s and the group’s interests. A contribution X of an individual might 
ensure the preservation of the common good or resource, because that contribution X would 
ensure that the provision level is attained. In that case the underlying principle that an individual 
is always better off by defecting rather than contributing is violated.  
Take, for instance a three-person public good game, each of individual has four 
endowments, which they can either contribute to the common pool, or keep to themselves. There 
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is a provision point of 9, meaning the common pool will cease to exist if fewer than 9 
endowments are in it. If a player knows that there are only 5 endowments in the common pool, 
the best response for that player is to contribute all of her 4 endowments so that the provision 
point is reached. Of course, in this decision situation, players do not know the current 
contributions of the others. As a consequence, she is uncertain whether her contributions are 
needed, or how many of her contributions are needed, to ensure the attainment of the provision 
point. Consequently there is no dominant strategy for an individual, meaning there is no choice 
that would always make her better off, regardless of what the other(s) are choosing. 
On a methodological level this means that two fundamental features of a dilemma 
situation are missing when a provision point exists.   First, there is not always a conflict between 
the group’s interest and the individual’s interest.  Second, an individual is not always better off 
defecting.    
 
Implications of the structure of a dilemma-game with a provision point for our understanding of 
human behavior  
In their conceptual review about social dilemmas Weber, Kopelman, and Messick (2004) 
proposed that people use appropriateness rules to make decisions in dilemma situations. One type 
of appropriateness rule is a coordination rule for attaining provision points. Hence, the question is 
how much coordination rules tell us about contribution behavior in dilemmas. Providing a 
provision point basically means that one provides focal point solutions. 
Consider the earlier example of a public goods game with three people, each of them has 
four endowments that they can either contribute to the common pool or keep to themselves. 
There is a provision point of 9, meaning the common pool will cease to exist, if fewer than 9 
endowments are in it. An obvious solution is provided by an equality rule: each of the three 
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players contributes three endowments. What you usually observe in these experiments is that 
participants do indeed contribute 3 endowments and there is not much variability around the 
contribution of 3. When the presence of a provision point provides a focal point for coordinating 
contributions, there are two consequences of that. 
One consequence is that experiments that use social dilemma games with a provision 
point reduce the opportunity to observe the effects of other factors on behavior. As long as there 
is an easy and obvious solution, other factors will not matter that much. A related notion stems 
from Snyder and Ickes (1985), who have made the argument that individual differences will be 
more influential under weak rather than under strong situations. A second consequence is that 
games with a provision point may yield different results than games without a provision point.  
Consider, for instance, the timing effect in public good games.  The timing effect refers to 
differences in behavior depending on whether players are deciding simultaneously or pseudo-
sequentially. When deciding pseudo-sequentially, players make their decision one after the other 
but their decisions are not revealed to the other player(s) until the game is over. Hence, the 
information set is the same as in a pseudo-sequential and a simultaneous procedure. In either 
case, players do not know what the other have decided when they make their choice.  The only 
difference is that they know that they are either deciding simultaneously or sequentially.  Abele 
and Ehrhart (in press), using a continuous public goods game, demonstrated that pseudo-
sequential, compared to simultaneous-movers are much more likely to defect, keeping all their 
endowments to themselves, and are also less likely to reciprocate the level of contributions that 
they anticipate from others.  Note that the order of decision in the pseudo-sequential had no 
effect; that is, both first and second movers exhibited less cooperation. 
Effects of timing have also been observed in dilemmas with provision points. Budescu, 
Suleiman, and Rapoport (1995), Budescu, Au, and Chen, (1997), had players play a threshold 
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resource dilemma in a pseudo-sequential order. Players’ requests decreased in the first three 
positions. The implications of this positional order effect in threshold dilemmas are however 
quite different: It suggests that the timing cue is used as a coordination device. Or, put 
differently, the one who gets to choose first gets more of the cake, even if moves are unobserved. 
Hence, while the timing-effect in continuous public good games tells us something about the 
effects of subtle cues on cooperative behavior, the positional order effect in threshold dilemmas 
tells us something about the use of subtle cues as coordination devices.  
Another example in which games with a provision point yielded different results than 
games without a provision point is, as Weber et al. (2004) have also noted, when investigating 
the effect of group size. Kerr (1989) showed that perceived efficacy decreased with group size in 
a step-level public good game. Perceived efficacy refers to the perceived criticality that group-
members ascribe to their own contributions. In one experiment Kerr (1989) did indeed find that 
group size was per se related to cooperation rates: he observed lower rates of contributing as 
group size increased. However, Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994) found the opposite effect. 
They used a continuous public good game and found that groups of size 40 and 100 provided the 
public good more efficiently than groups of size 4 and 10. Hence, when comparing the results of 
these two studies, it could be that group size is inversely related to cooperation rates in threshold 
public good games, while cooperation rates increase with group size in continuous public good 
games. One should, however, be careful with such a conclusion. Apart from Kerr using a 
threshold public good game and Isaac et al. using a continuous public good game, there were two 
other differences between the set ups of their experiments. First, Kerr used discrete contributions, 
participants could either contribute US$ 10 or not, with everyone getting US$ 20 if the provision 
point was reached. Isaac et al. permitted any level of contribution between 0 and 50 tokens, the 
total endowment given to participants.  Second, Kerr used a one shot game whereas Isaac et al. 
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included 10 rounds. We do not want to speculate here how these two factors could have 
interacted with group size and/or the version of the public good game and produced the obtained 
results. Our point is that the two data sets give additional reason to believe that continuous and 
threshold dilemmas public good games can yield different results. 
Another instance where step-level public good games yielded different behaviors than 
continuous public good games was demonstrated by Bornstein (1992). He compared a step-level 
and a continuous public good, when players consisted of groups of participants, instead of 
individuals. That is, he had 3-person groups playing against each other in a step-level or 
continuous public good. He found that more group members contributed in a step level compared 
to a continuous public good. Also within group discussion was more effective in order to enhance 
cooperation in the step-level than in the continuous public good. 
It is also likely that other interventions will yield different effects in continuous and 
threshold dilemmas. Consider, for example, the effects of commitment: It has been found that 
committing publicly to a certain contribution, for instance by announcing it, enhances the 
likelihood that the decision-maker will stick to this contribution rate. The question is whether this 
effect is psychologically equivalent in games that have and do not have provision points. When a 
provision point exists, the provision point likely guides both the commitment and the decision. 
There are, for instance, three people, each of them has four endowments, which they can either 
contribute to the common pool, or keep to themselves, and there is a provision point of 9. Players 
of this particular game are likely, when asked, to commit themselves to contributing 3 
endowments and are subsequently likely to contribute them. This means that people are likely to 
commit themselves to a fair division and stick to it. Indeed, learning that others have committed 
to a fair distribution of contributions will provide the incentive to stick to the commitment.   In a 
continuous public goods game no such “fairness rule” exists to guide commitments or decisions.  
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Learning, for example, that others have committed to contributing 3 units of endowment does not 
provide an incentive to reciprocate this level of commitment.  Thus, we cannot conclude that 
commitment enhances cooperation rates in continuous public good games or resource dilemmas.  
 
Are dilemma-games with a provision point best modeling our world? 
Behavioral scientists are often interested in using public good or common resource games 
to simulate dilemmas encountered in the social world.   In this endeavor, it is useful to 
incorporate features of the real-world dilemma in the game. The question is whether the examples 
cited in a typical article on public good and resource dilemmas mentions most closely resemble 
continuous or threshold games.  Consider the traditional example from Hardin (1968), who wrote 
about the commons’ dilemma. His example was the grazing of cattle on a common grazing land. 
If too many farmers put more and more cattle on the common grazing land, the cattle would eat 
all of the grass and the common grazing land would cease to exist. Whereas one can conceive of 
the complete destruction of the commons as a threshold, it is not the case that the dilemma is 
defined only relative to this extreme event.  The more likely outcome of overgrazing is that the 
profit to each farmer decreases because the cattle will not get enough to eat and thus not flourish.  
In this situation there is no single provision point. Every additional cow that a farmer puts on the 
grazing land increases the risk of degrading the grazing land and the risk of underfeeding the 
cattle.  
Take another often cited example, the water supply: If people of a community use too 
much of their fresh water, e.g. supplied by a lake, their fresh water will become a scarce resource, 
and there will be less for everybody. The lake would cease to exist if every drop of water were 
used, but again, there is no obvious, single provision point. It is not that the population would 
know that if together they used a certain number of gallons of water, there would not be any 
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water any more. It is more of a continuous function. With every gallon of water used, the 
difficulty and cost of providing water increases. 
The same is true for all environmental issues, on which public good and resource 
dilemmas have also been applied. The air pollution is a dilemma, and we are all involved in it. 
But there is no provision point. The issue, at least as people experience it, is not that at a certain 
level of emission of pollutants, the air will be too polluted for us to live in. The issue is that as the 
level of pollutants increases, the quality of life decreases.  
If you take the institutions that collect the public radio license fees (in Germany the GEZ, 
in the U.S., the public radio and TV), who are depending that consumers of radio and TV to pay 
their dues. The system can only survive on the long run, if a certain amount of people pays their 
dues. However there is no threshold, in the sense that if the nth person does not pay his or her 
dues than the system will collapse. Again, the provision of public TV and radio is continuous: 
The more consumers who contribute, the better the quality and quantity of the public service. 
One applied goal of experimental research on dilemmas is to learn how to reinforce 
behavior that is in the interest of the collective in real life dilemmas: in environmental issues, in 
the matter of license fees for public radio and TV, and in other cases where a public good needs 
to be provided or a non-excludable resource preserved (e.g. renewal of the public local library 
financed through donations or a commons grazing area maintained). But as we have outlined in 
the last paragraph, most of these real world dilemmas are not dilemmas with an obvious or 
clearly defined provision point. Thus, we cannot be sure what research using step-level public 
goods games tell us about behavior in these real world examples.  That is, not only do step-level 
games violate a defining characteristic of a social dilemma, they also compromise ecological 
validity. 
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Conclusions and Implications for a tilted S 
Why have social psychologists studied threshold dilemmas so extensively? We have 
outlined in the last paragraph that threshold dilemmas are not a good model of certain real life 
dilemmas. So insights into behavior in threshold dilemmas may generalize to many of the 
proposed referent situations in real life. Of course, there is basic research that never claims to 
model real life situations in experiments, but rather has the goal to gain insights into human 
behavior on a more fundamental level. But, as we have pointed out in the section about 
implications of the structure of public good games with a provision point, these games change the 
nature of social dilemmas in a fundamental way by imposing a coordination problem on top of a 
dilemma. It is unclear what kind of behavior a threshold dilemma is measuring. It is neither pure 
cooperative behavior, nor pure coordination behavior, but some mix of both. Thus, we question 
whether threshold dilemmas do provide an adequate methodological vehicle for exploring the 
effects of framing, social rules, social identity, feelings of groupness, social motives and other 
psychological factors that affect social behavior. 
One could, however, question whether real life dilemmas are adequately represented by a 
continuous linear function relating levels of contributing and provision of a public good. For 
instance, in order to maintain a local library, you need a minimum amount of money for the 
maintenance of the building, the cleaning of the shelves, and a minimum stock of recent books. 
Once that building is kept neatly in order, and books are periodically renewed, additional 
contributions to the library matter, as you can still buy new books, but they might not matter as 
much as initial contributions that allow for sustaining the essentials of the library. However, if 
there were not enough contributions to keep the building maintained, the library would not cease 
to exist; it would just be housed in a shabbier building with fewer new books. Thus that would 
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mean that some contributions matter more than others, depending on how much has already been 
given. However, a step-level public good does not model that situation either. Provision points in 
these games are arbitrarily determined, and represent the provision of the public good as all or 
nothing. It is for that reason that it violates the basic notion of the conflict between the 
individual’s interest and the interest of the group, and that a pursuit of the individual interest by 
all makes them worse off than had they pursuit the group’s interest. A tilted S-shaped continuous 
function (or a sine function) may provide a better model of many social dilemmas. The function 
between contributing and establishing the public good is continuous, which means that every 
contribution matters for the provision of the public good, and for every contribution an individual 
faces the conflict between its own interest and the group’s interest. With an S-shaped continuous 
function (as illustrated in Figure 1), it can be that, for any point along the curve, the individual is 
better off not contributing, but the collective would be worse off if all individuals refused further 
contributions. Nonetheless, there are regions where additional contributions matter less and 
regions where they matter more.  This is a feature of natural dilemmas that may partly account 
for the popularity of step-level games in social psychology.  In many cases, low levels of 
contributions cannot provide or sustain a substantial public benefit and, at high levels of 
contributions, there is relatively little value added to the public good by additional contributions.  
However, there is a region between these extremes where contributions to the public good matter 
more.  We suggest that these features are modeled better by a continuous S-curve than by a step-
level function.  What would be implemented with the S-shaped function, as opposed to a linear 
function, is the variation in the intensity of that conflict. In the regions were the steepness is low, 
a contribution makes less of a difference to the public good, than in the regions where the 
steepness is high. 2 
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In our comparison of step-level and continuous function social dilemmas, we have raised 
the concern that one can not assume that findings for one form of the game generalize to the other 
form.  At the heart of this concern is the fact that step-level games often provide a salient 
coordination rule that changes the nature of the psychological dilemma that arises when there is a 
conflict between individual and collective outcomes.  Nonetheless, one feature of the step-level 
game that is theoretically and ecologically interesting is the fact that marginal returns to the 
individual for contributing are not independent of what others contribute.  We propose the S-
shaped function because it maintains the psychological conflict between individual and collective 
interests and simultaneously captures the ecologically valid feature that collective benefits, and 
thus returns on investments, for contributing are typically greater in the mid-range than at the 
extremes of total contributions.  For example, in many public goods problems, people likely 
recognize that the collective benefit is meager if contributions are too low (e.g., a poorly stocked 
library in a shabby building serves a community poorly) and the value added by more 
contributions is limited if contributions are already high (e.g., adding an espresso bar to a well-
stocked, well-maintained library adds little to the library’s fundamental services).   We doubt that 
people frame their decisions to contribute in terms of being critical to the existence of the public 
good as they apparently do in a step-level game.  That is, they probably do not view their 
decision to contribute or not as determining whether public good exists at all.  Rather their 
decisions are based on a more complex, and perhaps subtle, set of considerations: e.g.,  how 
much will my contribution improve the public good and the benefit I will get from it and how 
will I feel about myself if I do or do not contribute.    
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Footnotes 
1 The provision point can also be defined in terms of the number of contributors, not the amount 
contributed: the minimal contributing set game. These games represent another methodological 
variation that has the same limitations as a step-level game. 
2 Marvel and Ames (1979) used a game that resembles the one that we are proposing.  However, 
their game, like a step-level game, included a region of total contributions in which it was more 
beneficial for a player to contribute than not to contribute.  
 
 
                                                 Continuous versus Step-Level Public Good Games -  19
Figure 1. An example of the relationship between levels of contributions and value of the public 
good as represented by a sine function. 
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